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Abstract. The present research examines operational performance and ver-
bal communication in airline flight crews under reduced crew operations 
(RCO). Eighteen two-pilot crews flew six scenarios under three conditions; 
one condition involved current-day operations while two involved RCO. In 
RCO flights, the Captain initially operated the simulated aircraft alone but 
could request remote crewmember support as off-nominal events occurred 
and workload was expected to increase. In one of the two RCO conditions, 
crewmembers were provided with advanced prototype collaboration tools 
designed to alleviate difficulties in crew coordination. Crews successfully 
solved all challenging events without accident and analyses of operational 
performance did not reveal any differences among the three conditions. In 
RCO flights, crew communication increased when tools were available rela-
tive to flights in which they were not; specifically, there were more acknowl-
edgements and decision-making communications. These results suggest the 
collaboration tools enable higher degrees of crewmember awareness and/or 
coordination during distributed operations.  
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1   Introduction  
 
The aim of the NextGen Air Transportation System is to increase the efficiency and 
capacity of the U.S. National Airspace System [1]. New NextGen technologies and 
services will require that airspace operators rely on automated support tools as traffic 
density is allowed to expand. Aeronautical equipment manufacturers and airlines will 
likely respond as well, taking advantage of a new system-wide infrastructure by ad-
justing their own aviation technology, product designs, and standard operating proce-
dures to fit the modernized airspace. 
We can also expect other innovations to occur as a result of NextGen. As flight 
decks become increasingly automated and communication media more advanced, 
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crew functions may be adapted to operate under distributed environments. A redistri-
bution of crew resources could provide many benefits to support NextGen operations 
while also reducing expenses, such as (1) greater flexibility and specialization of op-
erators adapted to support and solve problems in specific operations (2) consolidated 
operating procedures in low-workload, nominal phases of flight, and (3) reduced op-
erating costs and fuel savings as a result of smaller cockpits and less overnight ac-
commodations. Many technological and feasibility dimensions are under investigation 
for this distributed Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) concept (see [2] for initial con-
siderations). One challenge is retaining critical elements involved in crew functioning, 
especially the many facets of interaction that involve physical presence (e.g., visual 
monitoring of crewmember activity and visual updates). 
 
1.1   Importance of Crew Collaboration 
 
A flight crew’s ability to work together effectively as a team is crucial to the safety of 
commercial aviation. In the 1950s, this team component was initially overlooked as 
single pilot flight on piston airplanes expanded to involve more complex, multi-
operator procedures on larger jet airliners. As operations of the more stable airliners 
grew, aviation accidents due to mechanical issues dropped sharply. Consequently, 
human error resulting from poor intra-crew processes was exposed as the new prima-
ry barrier to further increasing aviation safety [3]. Despite improvements to cockpit 
interfaces and more rigorous operator training throughout the 1960s and 1970s, fatali-
ties from U.S. commercial and charter flight accidents did not decline. Instead, fatali-
ty rates remained fairly stable during this period, typically claiming three to five lives 
per 100,000 flight hours, or an average of roughly 240 people per year [4, 5].  
Beginning in the 1970s, insight from pilot interviews and accident investigations 
revealed safety-critical errors may be linked to crew coordination and communication 
rather than issues with individual operational skill [3]. Once this connection was es-
tablished, researchers started to investigate team skills that promoted effective team-
work to mitigate these errors. Specific strategies were identified and refined, such as 
the development of effective team workload management (e.g., using low-workload 
periods to prepare for upcoming tasks), and the use of pre-flight safety briefings to 
define responsibilities and encourage an open crew climate [6]. The practice of what 
is now known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) was found to be so essential to 
safe airspace operations that after March 1999, the FAA barred all U.S. commercial 
airline companies from utilizing pilots, flight attendants, or dispatchers that had not 
received training in these skills [7].  
With CRM practices and other improvements in air travel, aircraft safety has 
shown signs of improvement in recent years. In comparison to fatality rates described 
earlier, the past decade’s fatality ratings have dropped to an average of 0.10 fatalities 
per 100,000 flight hours (2003-2012 reports, 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operations 
combined [8]). As we continue to develop concepts of operation to best fit future 
needs while maximizing all available resources in NextGen, we must prioritize safety 
by keeping accident and fatality statistics at or below current levels. We have thus 
focused our initial RCO efforts on the design of an enhanced distributed flight crew 
environment that retains the qualities of effective CRM and specifically avoids sys-
tems that revert back to largely independent, separated operators who just happen to 
 be working on the same flight. Our research proceeded in two phases: first we identi-
fied the basic challenges that arise when crewmembers are spatially separated, and 
then we developed tools and procedures designed to overcome these barriers and 
enable effective distributed flight crews. 
 
1.2   Components of Crew Resource Management  
 
Many professional contexts today require that operators not only have necessary tech-
nical skills, but also are able to work effectively in teams. As a result, professional 
training also includes instruction in teamwork that is designed to enhance communi-
cation and decision-making. For instance, the airline industry instituted CRM training 
to develop in its operators proficient “team building and maintenance, information 
transfer, problem solving, decision-making, maintaining situation awareness, and 
dealing with automated systems” [9]. Airline CRM training programs aim to raise 
operator awareness concerning the dynamics of team interaction through initial indoc-
trination, and then target effective team interaction elements through recurrent prac-
tice and feedback with ongoing reinforcement. 
Contributions to these training programs stem from research designed to specify 
and quantify individual behaviors that impact team functioning. One approach is to 
classify the types of communication to tap team members’ shared situation and team 
models; specifically, to examine the extent to which team members have similar or 
compatible mental representations concerning their task, their operational environ-
ment, and their individual and joint roles and responsibilities [10]. This approach has 
identified communication patterns associated with high and low task performance. 
For instance, researchers observed that high performing crews talked more about 
plans and strategies as they coped with an emergency situation, and that Captains in 
high performing crews were explicit in allocating roles to crewmembers [6]. In the 
present research, we use crew communication analysis to evaluate a set of collabora-
tion tools specifically designed to mitigate CRM problems found in prior distributed 
flight operations research. 
 
1.3   Prior Reduced Crew Operations Research 
 
Our first RCO study was conducted with the goal of understanding differences in the 
task and team performance of crews who were physically separated when compared 
to collocated [11]. In this study, pilots either sat next to each other in a low-fidelity 
flight deck (collocated), or sat separately in one of two synchronized flight decks with 
an audio intercom for communication (distributed). Crews then flew challenging sce-
narios in current-day operations while we measured performance and pilot behavior. 
No differences in flight performance were found between the two conditions. 
However, analysis of video recordings revealed that there were more instances of 
pilot confusion in the distributed condition than in the collocated condition. Specifi-
cally, pilots were unsure about planned and completed actions by the other crewmem-
ber and expressed confusion about location of information on airspace charts and 
briefing materials. These findings suggest that visual cues that are present in a collo-
cated environment critically support pilots’ teamwork. Based on these findings and 
feedback from the pilot participants, we developed tools designed to reestablish this 
  
critical set of information. The current research examines the effectiveness of these 
advanced tools in facilitating interaction by analyzing verbal communication that 
relates to crew functioning. 
 
2   Method  
 
2.1   Participants and Design 
 
Participants were 36 airline pilots with ATP certification under 14 CFR Part 121. 
Seventy-eight percent of the two-pilot crews consisted of current (or recently retired) 
employees from different U.S. airlines. Five pilots were retired (range of 2 to 16 
months). 
The study design had two fixed factors (Crew Position and Operational Configura-
tion) and two random factors (Scenario and Crew). However, not all of these factors 
are critical to the current research objectives. As a result, all present analyses will 
collapse across Crew Position and focus primarily on a subset of data featuring a 
comparison of communications between two levels of Operational Configuration (for 
a more complete report, see [12]). 
The Operational Configuration factor reflected operational roles, physical configu-
ration, and technological capabilities. There were three conditions: current-day opera-
tions (Baseline) in which both participants operated on the flight deck, and two dis-
tributed RCO conditions in which participants were physically separated. In both 
RCO conditions, the Captain remained on the flight deck and the First Officer moved 
to a prototype ground station to provide remote support to the Captain as needed. In 
the RCO No Collaboration Tools condition (NCT), an audio intercom was provided to 
aid in remote crew interactions. In the RCO with Collaboration Tools condition (CT), 
an audio intercom and a set of collaboration tools were provided to aid in interactions. 
 
2.2    Technological Capabilities 
 
To operate the high-fidelity Boeing 737-900 flight simulator as a distributed crew, 
NCT flights had a second set of primary flight deck controls and an audio intercom. 
CT flights had the same capabilities and the Collaboration Tools described below. 
EFB and Audio. In both NCT and CT conditions, participants were each provided 
with an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) that contained approach plates and charts. An 
audio intercom allowed for voice communication between the cab and ground station.  
Collaboration Tools: CRM Indicators. In the CT condition, six custom-made indi-
cators functioned as devices for tracking critical roles and actions of the crew. On the 
flight deck, the indicators were implemented with touch-sensitive LED panels. Figure 
1 shows the speed, heading, and altitude indicators located below the corresponding 
controls on the MCP. The Pilot Flying indicator was located to the left of the MCP, 
and CDU and radio/ATC indicators were located above the CDUs. On the ground 
station, the indicators were grouped in a single window of a touch-enabled monitor. 
MCP control actions were displayed on the corresponding indicators with symbols 
(e.g., up or down arrows indicating changes in MCP speeds) and audio enunciations 
played when modified (e.g., “speed” enunciated speed changes). Once the action re-
 sulted in a stable value, the value was displayed in the indicator (e.g., “250”). MCP 
control modifications were simultaneously displayed and enunciated on both stations. 
The indicator procedures were also designed to clarify and enhance awareness of 
current roles and actions. Indicators associated with MCP actions represented the role 
of Pilot Flying while those associated with CDU actions represented the role of Pilot 
Monitoring. The text of each indicator was color-coded to signify current roles: green 
for current duties, white for distributed operator duties. For instance, green MCP indi-
cators and white CDU indicators on the flight deck would imply that the current role 
of the Captain is Pilot Flying. Concurrently, the ground station would have white 
MCP indicators and green CDU indicators to signify that the current role of the opera-
tor on the ground is Pilot Monitoring. A switch in indicator colors represented a 
switch in roles, and could only be done by the operator accepting Pilot Flying duties. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Flight deck in RCO with Collaboration Tools condition. The six CRM indicators are 
mounted adjacent to their corresponding instrument panel. Captain’s EFB is circled to the left.  
  
Collaboration Tools: Video Feed. In the CT condition, cameras and monitors oper-
ated from the side of each station to enable operators with views of their remote part-
ner. 
Collaboration Tools: Shared EFB. In the CT condition, operators could toggle be-
tween two modes to view EFB information: independent view (separate operator dis-
plays) and shared view (synched operator displays). The shared view allowed either 
operator to access, display, and maneuver (e.g., zoom in) a specific chart or plate with 
assurance that the same information was displayed on the other EFB. The Captain’s 
EFB also could display weather and traffic from a sector map on the ground station. 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 2. In RCO with Collaboration Tool condition, the traffic and weather sector map (circled, 
far right) and the charts and approach plates display (circled, mid-left) can be shared with the 
Captain, who is shown in the Video Feed (circled, upper left). Ground CRM indictors are to the 
left of the traffic and weather sector map. The ground operator shown is in CT training. 
 
2.3   Scenarios and Procedure 
 
All scenarios involved crew interaction under difficult circumstances. They contained 
challenging, off-nominal environmental and systems events and secondary challenges 
that required crews to divert to an airport other than their scheduled destination (see 
[12] for a more detailed scenario description). A scenario ended once a final decision 
was made concerning the last scripted event. The Operational Configuration factor 
(Baseline, NCT, CT) was counterbalanced with the scenarios, which were always in 
temporal order (e.g., medical emergency scenario always first flight of the day, 
wheel-well fire scenario always second flight of the day).  
Each crew flew under current-day Part 121 standard operating procedures in the 
Baseline condition. In NCT and CT conditions, the Captain initially operated the air-
craft alone. Soon after the onset of the first scripted event (within the first two 
minutes), the Captain signaled that crewmember support was needed with a verbal 
request for Dedicated Assistance. The Ground Operator (the First Officer) was then 
required to support the Captain by performing crewmember duties via a set of remote, 
synchronized flight deck controls as seen in Figure 2. Operating procedures were 
similar to current-day while participants were functioning as a crew (with additional 
Collaboration Tool procedures in CT flights). All Collaboration Tool functions were 
disabled before the Dedicated Assistance request in CT flights.  
2.4   Communication Coding  
In the RCO conditions (NCT and CT), each participant’s voice communication was 
recorded via audio intercom and saved for further analyses. Recordings were then 
coded using categories based on previous research [10], and subsequently analyzed to 
compare RCO conditions. Coding categories concerned explicit, task-relevant utter-
ances, with units defined as a clause (that is, a verb and its arguments). Categories 
 reflect types of mental models distinguished in the literature; specifically, the task, 
team and situation knowledge that team members need to have in common to support 
successful performance [10, 13, 14]. Coding categories were adapted from Orasanu 
and Fischer [6] who observed that high and low performance by flight crews was 
associated with distinct communication patterns. Table 1 lists each communication 
category with a brief description and examples. 
Table 1. Shared Mental Model Categories Applied to Crew Communication Recordings 
Contribution Category Example 
Acknowledgment: Confirming awareness/recognition 
     Acknowledgement/Agreement/Concessions 
     Repeats statement as confirmation 
 
“Alright”  
“Copy, flight level two nine zero” 
Decision-Making: Contribution concerns possible choices,  
  plans, and their evaluation 
     Priorities/Goals 
     Constraints/Evaluation 
     Decision/Options 
 
 
“What airspeed would you like?”  
“I don’t mind holding here”  
“Heading 270 I think would work” 
Situation Model: Contribution addresses critical          
  information concerning environment or system state 
     Request for system state, traffic, weather, etc. 
     Factual statement concerning system state, traffic, etc. 
     Contribution that adds to shared situation 
 
“Master O2 is on” 
“What does the ATIS report?” 
“There’s no weather at Denver” 
 
Team Mental Model: Contribution’s emphasis is on actor 
     Concerns own/partner’s action or knowledge  
     Refers to/directs partner’s action 
     Establishes shared knowledge of item/fact 
Workload: Contribution’s emphasis is on task and task  
  management 
     Contribution concerns task scheduling/procedures 
     Statement about task requests/requirement/completed 
“I just set the flight level to 310”   
“I’ll get with ATC here”  
“Just be sure to retract the speed  
  brake afterward”  
 
“Starting the descent checklist?”  
“We need to do call center” 
“Checklist complete”  
*Communication Problems 
     Request to clarify/repeat 
     Coordination problem in speaking (turn-taking) 
     Misunderstanding apparently undetected by pilots 
*Inaudible: Communications difficult to decipher 
 
“What was that?”  
“Go ahead” 
 
  ---- 
*These categories were excluded from analyses since they occurred in less than 1% of the 
communications in either RCO condition 
 
3    Results 
 
3.1   Operational Performance 
 
In all 108 flights, crews successfully solved all challenging events and no accidents 
occurred. Analyses of the aircraft state data did not reveal any significant differences 
among the three Operational Configuration conditions (e.g., speed, altitude, heading, 
pitch). This was expected due to the heterogeneity of the scenario structures. Addi-
tional performance measures are listed below in Table 2, including number of times 
crewmembers changed the destination airport in the Flight Management System 
  
(FMS), and agreement in final destination airport choice airport when compared with 
pilot subject matter experts (SME) who assisted in scenario development. No signifi-
cant effect was found in these measures as a function of Operational Configuration. 
 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Operational Performance Measures 
 
Operational 
Configuration  
Condition 
Final Airport            
Modifications       
in FMS 
SME Agreement   
in Final Airport 
Choice 
Fuel Used 
Per Minute 
Time to    
Complete     
All Events 
Baseline 
 
 
No  Collaboration 
Tools 
 
Collaboration 
Tools 
2.58 
(0.43) 
 
2.50 
(0.42) 
 
2.56 
(0.42) 
78% 
 
 
81% 
 
 
78% 
95.02 lbs 
(35.04 lbs) 
 
92.49 lbs 
(22.88 lbs)  
 
94.66 lbs 
(25.28lbs) 
17 min, 49 sec 
(2 min, 43 sec) 
 
17 min, 37 sec 
(2 min, 45 sec) 
 
18 min, 49 sec 
(2 min, 45 sec) 
 
A trend towards longer elapsed time in the CT flights suggest that crews took 
longer to complete all events in the CT condition than the NCT or Baseline condition 
(from scenario start to final decision in last scripted event). Although this difference is 
not statistically significant, it is consistent with findings reported in the communica-
tion analyses below. 
 
3.2   Communication Difference as a Function of Collaboration Tool Availability  
 
Communication coding was done directly from audio recordings using Audacity au-
dio editing software. Four coders were trained to identify units and assign them to the 
coding categories described in Table 1. Inter-rater reliably was checked for the four 
coders, and ranged between .76-.90 on units and .75-.80 on categories when compared 
to the trainer (Fischer). The present analysis focused only on within-crew communi-
cation; other communications were not included (e.g., ATC communications, ques-
tions for researchers, self-talk, reading of checklists). 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Crew Communication and Time Elapsed Measures  
Reduced Crew 
Operations 
Condition 
Time to Complete 
All Events from   
DA Request 
Time Spent in 
Crew Comm. 
Percent     
DA Time in 
Crew Comm. 
Total   
Comm. 
Units 
Units 
per Min 
Rate 
No Collaboration 
Tools 
 
Collaboration 
Tools 
 15 min, 34 sec 
 (3 min, 0 sec) 
 
 16 min, 20 sec 
 (3 min, 17 sec) 
6 min, 40 sec 
(1 min, 42 sec) 
 
7 min, 56 sec 
(1 min, 58 sec) 
 43% 
 
 
 49% 
173.81 
(50.11) 
 
198.06 
(60.63) 
11.16 
 
 
12.12 
 
Table 3 presents the results for several measures of communication quantity by 
RCO condition. As can be seen, measures were generally higher when crews had the 
Collaboration Tools compared to the No Tool condition. However, only one measure 
– the time crews spent communicating as they completed all scenario events – was 
 statistically significant, F(1, 17) = 7.98, p = .01. Crews talked for 76 seconds longer 
during CT flights than during NCT flights. The difference between conditions with 
respect to the number of units approached significance, F(1, 17) = 3.25, p = .09; none 
of the other measures were significant.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of Task-Relevant Communication Categories by RCO condition  
  
In addition to the quantity of crew communication, we also considered its content. 
Figure 3 shows what aspects of their task, teamwork, or situation that crewmembers 
addressed in their communications during each of the RCO conditions. A Chi-Square 
test revealed a significant association between type of communication and availability 
of collaboration tools, X
2 
(4, n=13,324) =18.65, p <.001. This analysis suggests that 
when distributed crewmembers could rely on collaboration tools, they were more 
likely to acknowledge a partner’s contribution and engage in decision-making com-
pared to flights during which they did not have the tools. Conversely, in the absence 
of collaboration tools crewmembers tended to talk more frequently about their situa-
tion understanding and their individual and joint actions.  
 
4   Discussion 
 
Previous research on teamwork in Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) suggests that 
distributed members of flight crews lack access to important visual cues, most notably 
regarding each other’s actions [11]. Current-day flight deck technologies do not sup-
port collaboration by distributed crewmembers. We therefore developed a set of col-
laboration tools to fill this need. The impact of these tools on the flight performance 
of 18 two-pilot crews and their communication was assessed in the present research. 
In this study, there were two conditions that involved a distributed crew and a base-
line condition where crewmembers were collocated. Collaboration tools and a voice 
intercom were available in one of the distributed conditions; the other condition in-
cluded only the intercom. The collaboration tools were: (1) CRM indicators represent-
ing current piloting roles and control actions (2) EFB displays of airspace information 
  
mirrored between stations (3) Video feeds showing the distributed crewmember in 
his/her station.  
 
4.1   Crew Communication and Collaboration Tool Availability 
 
The availability of collaboration tools influenced how much and what crewmembers 
communicated. The presence of tools seemed to have directed crewmembers’ atten-
tion to their joint responsibility for making safe decisions. They spent more time 
communicating, and more importantly, they shared more decision-relevant infor-
mation and were more responsive to each other. Apparently, since they had access to 
the same airspace information as well as information about their individual actions, 
they talked less about their current flight situation and teamwork and instead focused 
on decision-making. In contrast, during flights in which they did not have the tools, 
crewmembers were apparently more focused on establishing a shared situation under-
standing and common ground with respect to their teamwork.  
However, the presence of collaboration tools may induce a false sense of 
sharedness insofar as crewmembers may assume that just because visual information 
is shared, it is also commonly understood. A number of studies have shown that this 
assumption is not necessarily correct, such as those that found that pilots with compa-
rable experience interpreted identical environmental cues differently and as a result 
reached different decisions [15, 16]. In the present research for instance, the infor-
mation and feedback provided by the collaboration tools in displaying and providing 
step-by-step updates in coordination, action, or situation may lead crewmembers to 
verbally condense a series of operations that may have multiple implications and 
meanings. Findings like these are relevant to RCO operations, in particular if they will 
involve distributed team members with different professional training. As team mem-
bers differ in their professional background, their situation understanding may differ 
accordingly and may lead to misunderstanding and conflict [17, 18, 19]. Future re-
search will need to examine more directly than the present study how collaborative 
tools affect crewmembers’ shared situation understanding, specifically whether they 
lead to inadequate crew communication and misunderstandings.  
 
4.2   Operational Performance and Limitations 
 
The results of the operational performance analyses support prior RCO work that also 
did not find any performance differences between distributed and collocated flight 
operations [11]. This absence may be due to a number of limitations that resulted 
from the exploratory, multi-objective approach of the study, and this may have less-
ened any observed effect in operational performance among the two RCO conditions 
that was seen in crew communication and other subjective measures [12]. One likely 
aspect is that this was our first empirical test of the prototyped tools and their proce-
dures. Further refinement to the collaboration tools with more specific experiments 
may increase their effectiveness and produce differences in operational performance 
that were not observed here. For insight that may aid in future development, we solic-
ited participant pilots’ feedback on the collaboration tools in debriefing interviews 
and questionnaires.  
 Pilots primarily suggested improving the interfaces and modifying how often the 
tools presented information. A repeated suggestion to improve the shared EFB display 
was to develop a tablet application interface in which information is more easily ma-
nipulated on small screens and to move away from the desktop computer interface 
(mirrored from the ground station’s desktop). A sizable portion of Captains reported 
that the Video Feed was distracting at times, which is understandable when consider-
ing that many of the ground station’s displays were modified or new when compared 
to a traditional flight deck and thus unfamiliar without the training given to First Of-
ficers. Also, a few pilots suggested that the Video Feed would be more useful if it also 
contained a view that focused on the primary flight deck panels for viewing manipula-
tions as they occurred. The last major improvement suggestion was to lessen the fre-
quency of the CRM enunciations. Future research in the development of these tech-
nologies and procedures for an RCO concept of operations will need to consider these 
suggestions, as well as findings presented here and in parallel reports [12].  
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